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Border Patrol 
by Carl E. Schneider 
cently, the Supreme Court has 
ncountered cases that concern 
erhaps our weightiest bioethical 
issue-how medical care is to be ra-
tioned. But this does not mean that the 
Court must therefore assess the justice of 
rationing, as many people incited by 
many journalists now fondly and firmly 
believe. In explaining why, we begin 
with a story about how Learned Hand 
remembered saying one day to Justice 
Holmes, "Well, sir, goodbye. Do jus-
tice!" Holmes turned quite sharply and 
said: "That is not my job. My job is to 
play the game according to the rules." 
If the Court doesn't do justice, what 
does it do? Partly, it does the crucial if 
dismal work of interpreting ambiguous 
federal statutes. But more centrally, the 
Supreme Court is a border guard that 
confines legal actors within the bound-
aries of their authority. It shows them 
where the frontiers are and sends them 
packing when they cross illegally. It 
tends the borders between individuals 
and their governments, between the 
state and federal governments, among 
the branches of the federal government, 
and even within branches of govern-
ment, especially the judiciary. 
The Court is additionally con-
strained from grappling with what jus-
tice requires by its border-patrol meth-
ods. Borders are best which are clear; 
good fences make good neighbors. The 
Court thus devises and deploys bright-
line rules and rules of thumb, rules that 
sacrifice something in justice to achieve 
something in efficiency. Such rules give 
legal actors relatively clear notice of 
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where the boundaries are and how 
boundary disputes will be resolved, thus 
reducing the many costs of uncertainty 
and litigation. 
Consider Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh. 1 
In 2000, Maine proved that Yankee in-
genuity is not dead by adopting the 
"Maine Rx Program." Maine Rx used 
the state's buying power to negotiate 
lower drug costs for Medicaid patients. 
It then asked drug companies to sell 
their products at the lower rate to all 
Maine residents. Should a company 
refuse, the state would make its drugs 
available to Medicaid patients only on 
advance approval. 
An association of drug companies 
challenged Maine Rx in federal court. 
But you can't just tell a court you don't 
like a statute or even that it's foolish. You 
need a legal argument. What could the 
drug companies say? If the people of 
Maine acting through their legislature 
want to do foolish things or wise things 
companies don't like, they may. 
The Framers of the Constitution 
gave the states primary authority to leg-
islate in areas of domestic concern, like 
health care. However, the federal gov-
ernment may spend money and regulate 
interstate commerce, and in the last cen-
tury it used this authority to reach 
deeply into areas originally confided to 
the states. A classic example is Medicaid. 
Congress made the states an offer they 
could not refuse: It proffered contribu-
tions to health care programs for the 
poor if the states would adopt programs 
that met various federal standards. The 
states acceded, and Congress enacted 
Medicaid. 
Maine, you will recall, used Medicaid 
funds to pressure drug companies to 
lower their rates for everyone. The drug 
companies argued that the Maine 
statute (Maine Rx) therefore conflicted 
with the federal statute (Medicaid). The 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
provides that federal law preempts con-
flicting state law. The drug companies, 
then, did not contend that Maine Rx 
was unfair or that it recklessly disrupted 
free markets; they contended that Med-
icaid preempts Maine Rx. In other 
words, they said Maine had crossed the 
borders of its authority. 
There are boundaries within the judi-
cial branch, and one of them allocates to 
the District Courts (federal trial courts) 
the initial authority to hear claims. The 
drug companies-now the petitioners-
asked such a court to declare the law in-
valid and to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion putting the law in abeyance during 
the litigation since, they said, they were 
being irreparably damaged by a law that 
was surely void. To receive the injunc-
tion, they had to show that they would 
probably convince the court by the end 
of the litigation that the statute was in-
valid. 
The petitioners introduced affidavits 
contending that prior-approval require-
ments deter doctors from prescribing 
drugs. If so, said the petitioners, Medic-
aid recipients were hindered from receiv-
ing some drugs (those of companies not 
acquiescing in Maine Rx) in order to 
serve the interests of non-Medicaid re-
cipients (everybody else in Maine). 
Maine replied, so what? The Medicaid 
statute allows us to require prior ap-
proval, and it matters not why we 
choose to do so. 
The district court disagreed and 
granted the preliminary injunction. 
Maine went to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit, which 
quashed the injunction. The petitioners 
asked the Supreme Court to hear them, 
and the Supreme Court agreed. 
The Supreme Court confronted two 
boundary disputes: one between the fed-
eral government and Maine, and one be-
tween the district court and the appel-
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late court. But the Supreme Court did 
not try to identify optimal borders be-
tween the actors. Rather, it used rules of 
thumb to simplify its analysis. Unfortu-
nately, those rules were not entirely con-
sistent with each other. Indeed, so in-
consistent were they that, while six jus-
tices joined in upholding the First Cir-
cuit's decision, they could not agree on a 
reason. 
Essentially, the majority invoked two 
rules of thumb. First: state statutes pre-
sumptively do not conflict with federal 
statutes. In interpreting statutes, courts 
generally defer to democratically elected 
bodies and assume that legislatures are 
acting legitimately and that federal and 
state governments are cooperating. If 
this means a court sustains a state statute 
that Congress thinks impedes a federal 
statute, then Congress can always exer-
cise its power of preemption more ex-
plicitly. Furthermore, as one justice 
noted, Congress had already protected 
its Medicaid statute by authorizing the 
Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to reject important aspects of state 
Medicaid plans. Finally, buttressing this 
first rule of thumb was a second: prelim-
inary injunctions are disfavored, since 
they are issued before any court has 
heard all the evidence and arguments. 
In light of these two rules of thumb, 
the majority subjected Maine Rx only to 
sympathetic scrutiny. Maine Rx did not 
conflict with the Medicaid statute be-
cause the justices could imagine ways 
Maine Rx promotes Medicaid goals: 
Maine Rx serves medically needy peo-
ple, just as the Medicaid does. Making 
drugs cheaper might help people remain 
healthy enough to stay off the Medicaid 
rolls, thus saving Medicaid dollars. And 
prior authorization would actually bene-
fit Medicaid clients, since it would dis-
courage doctors from prescribing inap-
propriate drugs and encourage them to 
prescribe cheaper ones. 
The three dissenters relied on yet a 
third rule of thumb: appellate courts 
should overturn preliminary injunctions 
only if the trial court "abused its discre-
tion" in issuing it. Appellate courts are 
loath to say a trial court has abused its 
discretion, so the rule of thumb basical-
ly means that in these matters appellate 
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courts should defer to trial courts, 
which are closer to the evidence and the 
situation than appellate courts. In addi-
tion, courts want to discourage "inter-
locutory appeals," appeals before the 
trial court has issued its final decision, 
since they can prolong litigation and can 
require appellate courts to confront 
questions that might have been resolved 
had the litigation proceeded uninter-
rupted. 
Animated by this rule of thumb, the 
dissenters thought the Medicaid pur-
poses the majority attributed to Maine 
Rx absurdly speculative. The dissenters 
observed that the trial court had held no 
hearings and that there was thus no evi-
dence that Maine Rx would actually 
promote those purposes. And the dis-
senters said, Come on, it's obvious that 
Maine Rx puts barriers between Medic-
aid patients and the drugs of companies 
that resist the pressure of Maine Rx. 
Furthermore, if Maine Rx could use 
Medicaid to raise money to subsidize 
drug purchases by non-Medicaid pa-
tients, what stops states from using their 
Medicaid power to raise money for 
ridiculously unrelated projects like 
building bridges? 
So what does this case tell us about 
the desirability of any rationing method 
or any other health care issue? Nothing. 
The Court did not even decide whether 
the Medicaid statute preempts Maine 
Rx. The Court concluded that the trial 
court abused its discretion in issuing the 
preliminary injunction, but this just 
means that the plaintiffs are back in the 
District Court seeking a permanent in-
junction. They have not yet had, but 
presumably will want, a chance to prove 
that Maine Rx impedes the Medicaid 
statute. And the HHS Secretary may 
still attempt to use his authority to cause 
Maine to repeal its statute. 
Indeed, one might wonder whether 
the Supreme Court did not violate one 
of its own rules of thumb. The Court's 
principal job is not to correct errors by 
courts below. Litigants have one bite at 
that apple, and that is in the Courts of 
Appeal. The Supreme Court's principal 
job is to resolve disagreement among 
those Courts of Appeal about points of 
law and, where an issue is exceptionally 
important, to advise those courts even 
before disagreements arise. The Court's 
rule of thumb is thus something like 
"when in doubt, refuse to hear a case." 
The Court receives requests in thou-
sands of cases and typically rejects all 
but about a hundred. 
Were I a justice, I would have voted 
to "DIG" the case-to "dismiss" the pe-
tition for certiorari as "improvidently 
granted." The Court granted that peti-
tion because "the questions presented 
are of national importance." Perhaps, 
but "national importance" usually 
means really important; for example, is 
the draft unconstitutional? In any event, 
the Court took the case before the trial 
court had gathered evidence and made a 
final ruling, before the HHS Secretary 
had proffered his department's expert 
views, before the First Circuit had con-
tributed its mature reflections, and be-
fore the various Courts of Appeal had 
begun their conversation. The Court 
consequently had little evidence about 
Maine Rx's actual effects and little help 
in deciding whether it affronted the 
Medicaid statute. Perhaps consequently, 
the Court could proffer no lucid guid-
ance to lower courts or the state and fed-
eral governments. 
But such is life on border patrol. This 
is constitutional law in a literal sense. 
The Constitution constitutes a govern-
ment. The Supreme Court tries to en-
sure that its constituent parts work and 
work together as the Framers intended. 
To interpret the Court's pursuit of that 
assignment as an attempt to assess the 
wisdom and justice of legislation is to 
mistake steel for silver. 2 Steel may lack 
the glitter, but it's got the strength, and 
it should be assayed and appreciated for 
what it is. 
1. 123 S Ct 1855 (May 19, 2003). 
2. While it is not the Court's assignment to 
decide what justice requires, it is conventional-
ly said that its members cannot help being in-
fluenced even in border-patrol work by their 
private sense of the justice of the policies at 
stake. No doubt. But consider that the majori-
ty here comprised Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas and that 
the dissenters were Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
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